Poker Tournament Analysis: KilkennyMan, 6/20/05, WSOP Step #1

Poker Tournament Analysis: KilkennyMan, 6/20/05, WSOP Step #1
by Martell

This week, I will be analyzing another $11 single-table No-Limit holdem tournament, but one with a twist. This is the first of a series of "Step" tournaments, where the top finisher gets an entry into Step 2, and the next few subsequent places get reentered in Step 1. This tournament was played on June 20, 2005, and was submitted by KilkennyMan. In this article, I will be focusing on ways that stack size effects tournament play, with other analysis added along the way.

Hand #2—Blinds are $10/$15, and KilkennyMan is in the big blind with pocket Queens. There are two limpers and the button raises to $80. KilkennyMan reraises to $180. The limpers both fold and the button calls. The pot is $400.

This is a good reraise, and for a good amount. The objective with this bet is to isolate against the initial raiser. And if he comes back over the top of him, KilkennyMan can still get away from the hand if he chooses without too much damage.

The flop comes As, Qs, 6d. KilkennyMan bets $100 and the button calls.

Overall, I like this bet. It's cheap enough that a hand like King Queen or pocket Tens can take off a card, thinking that they have a chance to catch up. The only bad thing about it is that it makes it correct for a flush draw to call. But since both the Ace and the Queen are part of the flush draw, it becomes much less likely that the button's hand—which he raised with before the flop—contains two spades.

The turn is 7d. Both players have $505 left. KilkennyMan bets $300, the button raises all-in, and KilkennyMan calls.

I disagree with betting $300 here. With two flush draws out there, I think KilkennyMan should have either bet his whole stack—in an attempt to protect his hand against a draw—or should have bet $150. This leaves enough room for his opponent to come over the top in an attempt to steal the pot. It also could make a flush draw incorrectly call, as he would believe he was getting 5 to 1 on a 4 to 1 draw (9 outs), when in reality he only had a 5.5 to 1 chance of winning (7 outs).

Of course, even though it should have been obvious that KilkennyMan was pot-committed, his opponent still tried the bluff raise. Or maybe he thought pocket 5s were good. To paraphrase P.T. Barnum, "You will never go broke underestimating the intelligence of online poker players."

Hand #7—Nine-handed, KilkennyMan is the big stack and is dealt AK suited in middle position. There are two callers and he calls as well. Two other players call.

I like this call here. Early in a tournament, it's hard to raise enough to get voluntary callers to fold. You end up outbetting the pot, and then if you get check-raised, you either lose more money than you should have (when you fold), or you end up committing even more money with a drawing hand (when you call or reraise).

The flop is 2d, 2h, 5h. Everyone checks to KilkennyMan, who checks his flush draw. The next player bets $100, everyone folds, and KilkennyMan calls.

This is not a horrible call, since KilkennyMan has 15 cards to improve his hand, and may even win without improving. Of course, none of the cards that improve his hand give him the nuts, so he very well may be drawing dead. I would have preferred to see him either place a pot-sized bet himself or fold to this bet.

When you have a big stack, it's much better to be the aggressor with this type of hand, a medium strength hand that has a good chance of improving. If you can afford to risk losing a few chips, why not take a shot at the pot? KilkennyMan already had shown down a strong hand and knocked a player out in the process, so the table knows that his bets are serious. This would have been a good opportunity to test that image, to see how the rest of table was going to respond to his bets.

The turn is 2s. KilkennyMan checks, his opponent goes all-in for $655, and KilkennyMan folds.

No brainer. There is no way he can call this bet.

Hand #12—Still nine-handed, the blinds are now $15/$30. KilkennyMan has the largest stack at $1470 and is dealt JT offsuit in the small blind. The player under the gun limps in, the next player makes a minimum raise to $60 (by the other $1400 stack) and the next player calls. KilkennyMan and the original limper call. The pot is $330.

Not a horrible call, what with the implied odds and all, but I don't like that the betting has been reopened to the limper. Against any type of raise, I like to stay uninvolved and just watch the hand play out.

The flop is Qs, 9c, Ad. KilkennyMan and the limper check, the original raiser bets $150, KilkennyMan calls, and the rest of the players fold.

Because he has such a big stack, KilkennyMan has tremendous implied odds on this hand (the raiser is the other big stack). Combine that with the fact that he's got eight outs to the nuts, and KilkennyMan is pretty much forced to make this call. But here are the problems: around 80% of the time, he's going to miss his draw on the turn and have to fold, and even if he makes his hand, who knows how much money he can really get out of his opponent? In calculating implied odds, you can't automatically assume that you can get your opponent's entire stack if you make your hand. Only the amount you can actually win counts as implied odds.

The turn is 9h. Both players check. The river is 2c. KilkennyMan checks, his opponent bets $120, and KilkennyMan folds.

Based on his conservative play when the board paired, I don't think KilkennyMan could have busted his opponent if he had made his hand on the turn, unless his opponent flopped a set and was slow playing a full house on the turn. This would be a good thing to put down in the Players Notes section for this player.

Hand #21—Eight-handed with blinds of $25/$50, KilkennyMan now has $1230 and is dealt KJ offsuit in the small blind. Everyone folds to him, he raises to $100 and the big blind calls.

This is the classic case of a raise destined to fail. It totally looks like a steal, and while King Jack is quite possibly the best hand, it's not the kind of hand you want to play heads up out of position. A standard raise of $200 here probably does the trick, especially since the big blind only had about $600 left.

The flop is Td, 9h, 2s. KilkennyMan bets $100, the big blind raises to $275, and KilkennyMan calls. The pot is now $750.

I like the bet on the flop, but once the big blind raises, KilkennyMan has to release this hand. Two overcards and a gutshot are not enough to call an additional $405. Yes, $405, not $175. If KilkennyMan misses on the turn and that card is not an Ace or another Ten, he's going to have to call the additional $230 dollars, because the only way he can rationally call the extra $175 in the first place is if he believes any King, Queen or Jack will win the hand for him. The four Queens alone are not enough to make that call.

The turn is 4s. KilkennyMan checks, the big blind goes all-in for $230, and KilkennyMan folds.

I don't understand this play at all. If he has ten outs, he's getting 4 to 1 on a 3.5 to 1 shot. He was only getting about 3 to 1 for his $175 call on the flop. This situation is laying better odds for essentially the same draw.

And if he truly should have called the $230 bet, then what he really should have done was bet the $230 on the turn himself. When the choice is between checking and calling all-in or betting all-in, it's almost always better to bet. Of course, there's always the possibility that he just hit the "Call" button by mistake on the flop. That's pretty much the only reason I can think of to explain his play on the turn.

Hand #27—Now seven-handed, KilkennyMan has $855 and is dealt A4 offsuit in the big blind. The player under the gun raises to $100, and both the small blind and KilkennyMan call. The pot is $300.

This is a very dangerous call. This is exactly the type of hand that you don't want to play against a raiser and a caller—a bad Ace. Most of the time you're going to miss; if you hit your Four, there will be overcards along with it; and when you hit your Ace, you've got kicker problems. I would save the $50 and stay out of trouble.

The flop comes Ac, Jh, 7h.

Uh-oh.

The small blind checks, KilkennyMan checks, the original raiser bets $175, the small blind check-raises to $350, and KilkennyMan folds.

Well! This was the PERFECT way to play this hand. Since there is no threat of an overcard, KilkennyMan can afford to check and see what happens. If the original raiser also checks, he then gets to see what the small blind does on the turn. Or, if the original raiser bets (as will usually happen), he can just fold his hand and stay out of trouble. That he got to see the small blind check-raise is an added bonus, but he should have folded no matter what the small blind did.

Hand #32—Six-handed, the blinds are now $50/$100. KilkennyMan has a stack of $730 and is dealt A9 offsuit under the gun. He goes all-in and everyone folds.

With a stack size of about seven times the big blind, KilkennyMan correctly identifies that he is in "all-in mode," meaning that any raise he makes before the flop should be an all-in bet. But this was probably an unnecessary risk to take with this weak of a hand, considering that the two players behind him each had stacks about half the size of KilkennyMan. If either one of them were to get knocked out, everyone left would be guaranteed at least a reentry into another Step #1.

Of course, you may be thinking, "But it worked out for him!" All poker decisions should be evaluated on the logic behind them, not the end result. Since the decision is always made before the result is known, that is one factor that should never be a part of the evaluation.

One other note: It seems, looking back, that this decision was largely a result of KilkennyMan's earlier decisions; if he had chosen to hold on to $300-$400 that he had wasted earlier, he wouldn't have been so short-stacked and probably wouldn't have felt compelled to try and make a move with this hand. This is an important thing to keep in mind during the early and middle stages of a tournament—any chips that can be either acquired or saved during this time can keep you from putting your whole stack at risk later.

Hand #35—Still six-handed, KilkennyMan has $730 and is dealt A9 offsuit on the button. The small blind has $217 and the big blind has $523. Everyone folds to him, he raises all-in, the small blind calls, and the big blind folds. His opponent has K9 offsuit, and KilkennyMan ends up winning the hand with a flush.

Same hand, different situation. Here, he's now on the button and three people have already folded. He has both of his opponents covered, so even if he does lose, he can't get knocked out of the tournament on this hand. And since the blinds are short-stacked, they may be more inclined to take a chance with a subpar hand, out of desperation. I think the all-in raise is by far the best play that could have been made with this hand.

Hand #43—Four-handed, the blinds are now $75/$150, KilkennyMan has $1297 and is dealt AK suited in the big blind. Two players fold, the small blind raises to $400, and KilkennyMan reraises all-in. The small blind calls with pocket Nines. The flop is 2h, 7c, 9h, which gives the small blind top set and KilkennyMan a flush draw. The turn is Ks and the river is 8h. KilkennyMan wins with a flush.

There's nothing strategically noteworthy about this hand. I just included it for the drama and because it will explain where all KilkennyMan's chips came from. In just about any tournament, you have to get lucky and win a couple of coin tosses in order to do well. Unfortunately, there's no real strategy on how to make that happen...

Hand #53—Still four-handed, the blinds are now $100/$200. On the button, KilkennyMan has $1994 and is dealt AJ offsuit. The first player folds, KilkennyMan raises to $600, and both blinds fold.

KilkennyMan now has about ten times the big blind, so he is no longer in "All-In Mode," meaning that he can now make a standard raise. I generally prefer a raise of four times the big blind, but in this case, I believe that KilkennyMan noticed that the game had really tightened up and that a raise of three times the big blind would be strong enough.

The goal of poker is almost always one of two things: either bet the least amount of money you can to make your opponent fold, or bet the most money you can and still have your opponent call.

Hand #55—Still four-handed, KilkennyMan has $2294 and is dealt A7 offsuit in the big blind. The first player goes all-in for $1585, and everyone folds.

Ace Seven may very well have been the best hand, and is certainly a good enough hand to raise with in a four-handed game. But it's not a good enough hand to call with, and KilkennyMan made a good laydown. He correctly chose to wait for a time when he could be the raiser, which is always the better position to be in.

Hand #57—Still four-handed, KilkennyMan has $1994 and is dealt QJ offsuit on the button. The first player raises to $400, KilkennyMan folds, and both blinds fold.

Once again, KilkennyMan could easily have been tempted to see the flop with this hand, but wisely chose to wait for a time when he could be the raiser. By protecting his stack now, he will be able to exert more pressure on his opponents later.

Hand #61—Still four-handed, the blinds are now $150/$300. KilkennyMan has $2294 and is dealt A2 offsuit on the button. The first player folds, KilkennyMan folds, and the small blind folds.

Once again, I think this is a very smart fold. Yes, the game is tight. Yes, he had an Ace, so he probably had the best hand. But Ace Two is an extremely vulnerable hand—the only hands it dominates are other hands with a two in them. Staying out of trouble for a little while longer seems like a very good idea.

The strongest argument for betting: Since the game is so tight, and we have seen that even a minimum raise has gotten the blinds to fold, he could have put a $600 raise out there, and even if he was called, he still would have position. This would be one of the few cases where I might actually recommend a minimum bet...what has the world come to?!?

Hand #62—STILL four-handed, KilkennyMan has $2294 and is dealt pocket Sevens under the gun. He makes a minimum raise to $600, both the button and small blind fold, and the big blind goes all-in for $1431 with AQ offsuit. KilkennyMan calls, and his pocket Sevens hold up.

Recognizing that the game is tight, KilkennyMan only attacks the blinds with a minimum raise. He ends up winning another coin toss.

Hand #70—Three-handed, KilkennyMan is the big stack with $3575 and is dealt Q9 offsuit on the button. He raises the minimum to $600 and both blinds fold.

Once again, the minimum raise proves to be the right amount for this table. Because he has such a large stack, because the table is so tight, and because he hasn't played a hand since he had those pocket Sevens, his raise here is well-respected.

An important part of winning tournaments consistently has to do with looking for situations to steal the blinds. This doesn't mean just looking for times when you are in late position and nobody has called. It means looking at everything—position, your stack size, the blinds' stack sizes, your perceived table image, how tight is the table, how long has it been since you've raised—to determine whether or not you think a raise will win you the blinds.

If you start raising more frequently, stay aware of your table image. You will start to make your opponents more and more suspicious, and they will start looking for an opportunity to call you. Fortunately, you will still get your fair share of premium hands, so if you steal the blinds with subpar hands a couple of times, you should wait until you get a premium hand (or until they've seen you fold a few times) before attacking again. If you're lucky, you'll get a premium hand right when they're the most suspicious, and they'll end up falling right into your trap!

Hand #78—Heads-up with the blinds now $200/$400, KilkennyMan has $4225 and is dealt QJ offsuit in the small blind. He raises it to $800 and his opponent folds.

KilkennyMan is taking advantage of his tight image and starting to pick up some blinds. He also raised the previous hand and won. His opponent is probably starting to look for an opportunity to get involved with any sort of hand.

Hand #80—Same situation as two hands ago, KilkennyMan is dealt JT offsuit in the small blind. He raises to $800, and his opponent folds.

The suspicion is building...

Hand #80—With the blinds now $250/$500, KilkennyMan is dealt K6 offsuit in the big blind. His opponent calls $250 more, and KilkennyMan checks. The flop is Kh, Ts, 5d. KilkennyMan checks, his opponent bets $500, KilkennyMan check-raises to $1500, his opponent reraises all-in for $1375 more, and KilkennyMan calls. His opponent had 53 suited, the pair of kings hold up, and KilkennyMan wins the tournament.

It was only a matter of time before he snapped. Calling to see the flop with Five Three suited, then flopping bottom pair—yes, any pair on the flop is usually good heads up. But KilkennyMan check-raised, which he hadn't done much of at all this match. That should have been a red flag for his opponent right there.

I suspect that all KilkennyMan's recent raising—and all the folding by his opponent—just added to his opponent's frustration. He was probably so happy to finally have a pair, that he decided he was not going to back down this time no matter what. Remember this dynamic, and if you have a tight opponent, try to build his frustration and suspicion with some timely steals, and sooner or later (probably sooner), he'll end up jumping into the fire.

Send any tournament summaries or other poker questions to martell@babblog.com.