In addition to writing (which doesn’t quite pay the
bills yet), I’m also a professional poker player.
Although I usually refer to myself as a semi-pro or
a bush leaguer, I am officially renouncing my amateur
status and going pro (thus disqualifying myself for
Olympic competition). I’ve been unemployed for
the past year and I’ve been playing more and more poker,
and I’m close to getting to the point where I can stop
living off my savings and rely on my winnings to pay
the bills. Since all "famous" professional
poker players got that way by writing about the topic
(or maybe it’s the other way around--no matter), I figure
that I should start writing about poker myself.
This
is the first of a series of articles on No-Limit Holdem
poker strategy, since that is my game of choice. I’m
assuming that my audience already has a basic understanding
of the game from watching it on TV or playing in home
games. If not, click
here for some basics on the game (and a lot of strategy
tips). I will mostly be writing on strategy for “cash”
or “ring” games, as opposed to tournament play, since
I play mostly cash games. Lately, I’ve been playing
mostly the $200 buy-in game at the
Bicycle Casino. Enough background and on to the
lesson...
I
was at the Bike today and the $200 game got shorthanded,
with some strong players at the table. I remembered
the old poker saying, “If you can’t find the fish at
the table, it’s probably you,” and I decided to switch
over to one of the $100 buy-in tables. I got in trouble
early and had to re-buy, this time for $150. After playing
a while, I won a big pot with pocket 7’s when the flop
came 7-7-8 and my opponent had pocket 8’s. One more
8 would have given me over $20K of the bad-beat jackpot,
but it didn’t come and I was happy enough to double
up my stack. But this is still superfluous; let me get
to the hand of the night.
I
limped in with KQ off-suit in early-middle position
and five players saw the flop, which was Q-4-4. It was
checked to me, and I bet $10 at a $11 pot. I was called
by two players behind me, and checked the turn when
a 6 came. The person after me bet $20 and the next person
called. I called. The river came a 9 and I checked again,
with the same person moving all-in for $65. The other
player folded and the action came to me, and I sat for
a second and thought about whether or not I should call.
I said, out loud so everyone at the table could hear,
“When am I going to learn this lesson? You played the
hand like you had a 4. When am I going to learn not
to call a bet on the river when I think that I’m beat?”
I then proceeded to call the bet and he turned over
a 4-9.
A
few minutes later, I decided to take a break to clear
my head. I went outside and I started smiling. I realized
that the time that I learn that lesson was NOW. I realized
that I had just spent my last $65 on a mistake that
has been a huge drain on my game. I decided at that
moment that I was going to stop that leak in my game.
When I returned to the game, I didn’t have the sullen
scowl of a dejected player who was upset because I had
made a mistake. I was still smiling, happy and thankful
that I had finally learned my lesson.
Let’s
take a look at what went wrong in this hand. First off,
before the flop, I only called the blind instead of
raising. This play is debatable, but I stand by my play
here. In fact, earlier today, I was discussing whether
or not to raise with a hand like KQ in early position
with Shirley, one
of the props at the Bike. She thinks that it’s good
to raise so that you can protect your hand (especially
in limit holdem), but I still like to call in that situation.
That way I can decide whether or not to play if someone
else raises and I’ve only committed a minimal amount
of chips to the pot.
However,
not raising in this situation leaves open the possibility
that someone might play any two cards, since it’s inexpensive
to play the hand. So, when I saw the flop of Q-4-4,
I immediately should have been aware that someone might
have flopped trips. I made a pot-sized bet, and was
called twice. I like this play as well. I was basically
testing the waters to see if someone had a better hand
than I did. Here is where my play broke down. Once I
saw that two people called my bet on the flop, I should
have completely shut down and realized that I no longer
had a made hand. I now had a drawing hand--I was looking
for one of the remaining two Queens to come on the turn.
When that didn’t happen, I should not have put another
chip in the pot. My call on the turn was bad, and my
call on the river was horrible.
Calling
on the river is a very weak play, and it’s one that
has cost me a lot of money. Granted, I have won some
pots when I had a decent hand on the river and I faced
a bet from an opponent with a weaker holding or who
was bluffing. Overall, however, I have lost money from
calling on the river. That’s not to say that calling
on the river is always the wrong play, but it’s like
salt--it should be used sparingly.
When
you are faced with a bet on the river, the first thing
that you should do is put your opponent on a range of
hands that are reasonable given the way the betting
has happened on all previous rounds of betting. In this
case, I did that. I recognized that someone with a 4
could have easily limped in before the flop. Then, on
the flop, when two people called my pot-sized bet, I
realized that one of them probably did have a 4, because
in no-limit play, it is very common to flat-call when
you flop trips (three-of a kind when two of them are
on the board). Two people flat-called, and so I shut
down and did not bet on the turn. Now, facing a bet
and a call, I should have laid the hand down. But, let’s
say that for some reason I should have called the bet
on the turn (in cases where I had a flush draw, for
example). On the river, my hand was completely realized.
I had two pairs, with one pair on the board, and I knew
that anyone with a 4 beat me and I had already decided
that I thought that one of them had a 4. There was a
bet and a fold, and I was the only thing keeping this
hand going. Although I put my opponent on the correct
hand, I did not act on my read of the situation. Again,
this was a costly mistake.
Let’s
say that I decided that the range of reasonable hands
that this person could have (based on their betting
pattern), were either a 4 or a Queen with an 8 kicker
or better. So, basically, there were 3 hands that
I had beat (QJ, Q10, and Q8), one that I tied (KQ),
and a bunch that beat me. The next thing I had
to do was determine how often I thought my opponent
might bluff in that situation. With the numbers
I’ve provided, my opponent would need to bluff over
9% of the time for my call to be correct, which is a
bit more than one would expect in this low buy-in game--I
would say something in the 5%-6% range is more likely.
That being the case, it was a bad call for me to make,
costing me around $8 in the long run. Not the
end of the world, but not something I want to keep doing
either.
However,
as an experienced poker player, I was able to narrow
down the hands that I thought my opponent had. In fact,
I couldn’t imagine him reasonably having a single hand
worse than mine. The worst reasonable hand I expected
him to have was the same as mine: KQ. This makes my
call significantly worse. In order for me to profit
from calling, I have to assume that my opponent will
bluff nearly 30% of the time, or three times out of
every ten opportunities in this situation. Although
I believe that there are a few players who might come
somewhat close to that number, those players have well-publicized
reputations for bluffing. This opponent was not one
of those people. And even if he were, it would be only
a marginally profitable play at best. Therefore, in
general, it is not wise (or profitable) to call a bet
on the river in situations like this.
There
are, however, times when it is correct to call a bet
on the river:
1.
When you have a strong hand, for example pocket Aces,
two pair, or a set (three of a kind when you have a
pocket pair), but the board makes your hand vulnerable,
for example, when there are flush or straight possibilities.
In these cases, if the opponent has been betting on
each round, representing top pair or an over-pair, and
makes a small bet (in relation to the size of the pot),
then I believe that it is correct to call. Again, it
is important to put your opponent on a range of hands
and determine if it is an appropriate call, given the
size of the bet and the size of the pot. Another example
would be when you make a small flush, and your opponent
has been betting to represent a hand other than a flush
draw.
2.
When you have a hand that is strong enough to re-raise,
but your opponent has already made an all-in bet. An
example of how this could happen is if you flop top
pair and the nut flush-draw. You bet your top pair
the whole way, and when the river brings the flush,
your opponent moves all-in, either because he made a
smaller flush or because he thinks you will be scared
that he made a flush. In this case, you know you've made the
best hand but you only call because you no longer have
the option to raise.
3.
When you have been slow-playing a hand in an attempt
to trap your opponent. Although I did not slow-play
my Quad 7’s (mentioned above) on the river, had I chosen
to do so, I would have called an all-in bet on the river.
As in the last example, a call would be correct only because a raise is
not possible (as is the case when an all-in bet is made).
The
scenarios I’ve reviewed here specifically pertain to
heads-up play on the river (when only two people remain
in the hand). Adding a third or fourth opponent further
complicates the situation. I may get to that topic in
the distant future, but I did mention a few other concepts
that I will try to write about soon. Those include slow-playing
(also called “trapping”) and the concept of marginally
profitable hands. I plan for these topics to be discussed
in my next few articles.
One
last note... Looking from my opponent’s view in the
hand I’ve discussed here, if he were deciding whether
or not to bluff in this situation, he would have had
to predict that I would fold my hand about 70% of the
time for his bluff to be profitable. Now that I’ve decided
to stop calling in situations like this, my opponents
might be able to pull a few more moves on me, but that
will only mean that I’ll be able to make a lot more
money when I’m slow-playing a hand. But, like I said,
I’ll have to save that topic for another article.
Oliver
can be reached at oliver@babblog.com.
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